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Wallas’ four-stage model of the creative process: More than meets the eye? 
Abstract 
Based on a detailed reading of Graham Wallas’ Art of Thought (1926) it is argued that his 
four-stage model of the creative process (Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, Verification), 
in spite of holding sway as a conceptual anchor for many creativity researchers, does not 
reflect accurately Wallas’ full account of the creative process.  Instead it is suggested that a 
five-stage model that gives due recognition to the detailed treatment Wallas gave to the 
Intimation stage is a more authentic representation of his explanation of creativity.  A version 
of this model with three levels of ‘proximity to consciousness’ (non-consciousness; fringe 
consciousness; consciousness) and five stages (Preparation; Incubation; Intimation; 
Illumination; Verification) is presented as a general conceptual architecture within which 
relevant concepts and theories from more recent creativity research, including neuroscience 
and intuition, are positioned and from which a number of implications are drawn. 
Keywords: creativity; insight; intuition 
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Wallas’ four-stage model of the creative process: More than meets the eye? 
Introduction 
Wallas’ four-stage model of the creative process consisting of “Preparation, Incubation, 
Illumination (and its accompaniments), and Verification” (Wallas, 1926, p.10) is foundational 
in creativity research.  It has “shown its usefulness through years” (Runco, 2004, p.665) 
inspiring “hundreds, if not thousands, of spirited discussions and research projects” 
(Vartanian, Bristol, & Kaufman, 2013, p.xiv).  Despite being published almost nine decades 
ago the mode still holds sway as a conceptual anchor for many creativity researchers (e.g., 
Dewett, 2003; Dodds, Smith, & Ward, 2002; Ellwood, Pallier, Snyder and Gallate, 2009; 
Gallate, Wong, Ellwood, Roring, & Snyder, 2012; Healy & Runco, 2006; Horan, 2007, 2009; 
Horng & Hu, 2008, 2009; Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003; Jalil, 2007; Kristensen, 2004; 
Mainmelis, 2002; Norlander & Gustafson, 1997, 1998; Orlet, 2008; Pagel & Kwiatkowski, 
2003; Patrick, 1937; Penaloza & Calvillo, 2012; Rastogi & Sharma, 2010; Segal, 2004; Sio & 
Rudowicz, 2007; Yeh, 2004).  Although some creativity researchers have proposed finer 
granularities (e.g. Cropley & Cropley, 2005, 2012; Doyle, 1998) most have adhered to the 
basic framework to the extent that the four-stage model has the status of shared ‘in-house’ 
assumption (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) amongst creativity researchers.  Given this state of 
affairs it is perhaps worth taking stock and examining more closely Wallas’ writings in order 
to ask three questions: ‘what did Wallas actually say?’; ‘is there more to Wallas’ model than 
meets the eye?’; and ‘what are the theoretical and evidential implications of this reading of 
Wallas for creativity research?’ 
What did Wallas actually say? 
Graham Wallas’ (Figure 1) brief biography is as follows1: 
                                                 
1 http://archives.lse.ac.uk/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Catalog&id=COLL+MISC+0162.  
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/TUwallas.htm  Accessed 30th January 2014 
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Graham Wallas was born in Sunderland, England on 31st May, 1858 and educated 
at Shrewsbury School and Corpus Christi College, Oxford, where he obtained a 
second class degree in Literae Humaniores (Classics) in 1881.  He became a 
schoolmaster in 1884 at Highgate School, London.  In 1886 he joined the Fabian 
Society, a UK left-leaning political ‘think tank’ whose members also included 
George Bernard Shaw and H.G Wells.  He became a lecturer at the London 
School of Economics (LSE) in 1895, and became the LSE’s first Professor of 
Political Science in 1914.  He was described by colleagues as ‘benevolent’, 
‘kindly’, and ‘selfless’.  Along with The Art of Thought his other books included 
The Great Society (1914) and Human Nature in Politics (1924).  He retired from 
the LSE in 1923 and died in Cornwall on 9th August, 1932. 
Wallas’ Art of Thought was first published in London in 1926 by Jonathan Cape.  His 
motivation in writing the book was for “an improved art of thought” based on a “scientific 
explanation” of thinking (Wallas, 1926, p.7).  The book is in 12 chapters.  The four-stage 
model of creativity is presented the fourth chapter, ‘Stages of Control’ (pp.79-107).  In order 
to simplify the intellectual challenge he had set himself Wallas focused on single 
‘achievements of thought’ in order to attain clear delineation of relevant psychological 
events.  The “single achievements” Wallas chose to concern himself with were making a 
“new generalization”, creating a “new invention”, or in the “poetical expression” of a new 
idea (p.79).  The evidential basis of his model included the writings of Helmholtz, Poincaré 
and various poets.  His model is rooted in the psychologies of Aristotle (p.63 of The Art of 
Thought), James (p.97), Dewey (p.98), Wundt (p.98), and Freud (via the now little-known 
Belgian psychologist Varendonck, p.67ff).  The baseline assumption in Wallas’ writings is 
that “creative thinking can be delineated” and this led him to a “four-stage description of the 
creative process” (Runco, 2014: p.21) 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Helmholtz and the process of scientific discovery 
Wallas was able to “dissect out” (Wallas, 1926, p.79) a tangible process of scientific 
discovery.  He began by analyzing the speech the great German physician and physicist 
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Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1884) gave at his 70th birthday banquet on 2nd November 1891 in 
which he described how his most important new thoughts came to him: 
“[Following] previous investigation of the problem in all directions…happy ideas 
come unexpectedly without effort, like an inspiration.  So far as I am concerned, 
they have never come to me when my mind was fatigued, or when I was at my 
working table…they came particularly readily during the slow ascent of wooded 
hills on a sunny day” (Helmholtz quoted in Wallas, 1926, p.80; cited by Wallas 
from Rigano, 1923, p.267-268). 
Wallas selected only this short extract from Helmholtz’s speech, however the speech does 
contain other pertinent observations: 
“An investigator, or an artist, who is continually having a great number of happy 
ideas, is undoubtedly a privileged being…I have often been in the unpleasant 
position of having to wait for lucky ideas…They often steal into the line of 
thought without their importance being at first understood; then afterward some 
accidental circumstance shows how and under what conditions they have 
originated… But to reach that stage was not usually possible without long 
preliminary work.” (Helmholtz, An Autobiographical Sketch, in Cahan, 1995, 
p.389) 
In a supporting footnote Wallas also quoted the French symbolist poet Remy de 
Gourmont (1858-1915): “My conceptions rise into the field of consciousness like a flash of 
lightning or the flight of a bird” (Wallas, 1926, p.80).  From this brief expostulation Wallas 
discerned three stages in the formation of a new thought: (1) Preparation2: “the stage during 
which the problem was ‘investigated in all directions’”; (2) Incubation: “the stage during 
which he [Helmholtz] was not consciously thinking about the problem”; (3) Illumination: 
“the appearance of the ‘happy idea’ together with the psychological events which 
immediately preceded and accompanied that appearance” (Wallas, 1926, p.80).  It was from 
the more extensive writings of Poincaré on this subject that Wallas was able to embellish the 
process and discern the now familiar four stages (see below). 
                                                 
2  In keeping with Wallas I will retain the use of mixed upper and lower case for each of the four stages. 
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Poincaré and mathematical creation 
In addition to the three stages detected in Helmholtz’s birthday speech Wallas used the 
writings of the great French mathematician and his near contemporary Henri Poincaré (1854-
1912) to discern a fourth stage.  Poincaré’s account resonated with that of Helmholtz in so far 
as Wallas saw in it Preparation, Incubation, and Illumination.  However Poincaré paid 
particular attention to the post-Illumination phase.  Poincaré narrowed his focus of attention 
by concerning himself with mathematical discovery since in this the human mind “seems to 
take least from the outside world” acting “only of itself and on itself” thereby offering 
insights into what is “most essential” in the mind (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.22).  Wallas 
construed Poincaré’s two greatest mathematical discoveries as coming to him after specific 
periods of Incubation: first, involving military service as a reservist; second, involving a 
journey “during which no conscious mathematical thinking was done” (Wallas, 1926, p.81).  
The period of Incubation was one in which “much unconscious mental exploration took 
place”; the outcome of this stage (Illumination) is not a “ready-made result” instead 
Incubation supplied a starting point (Wallas, 1926, p.81) for further work in the Verification 
stage. 
The term Verification is borrowed directly by Wallas from Poincaré.  The latter used it 
on three separate occasions in his own account of the process of mathematical creation that 
was first published in English translation in 1915 from the original French Le Raisonnement 
Mathématique (1908, emphases added): 
“It is necessary to put in shape the results of this inspiration, to deduce from them 
the immediate consequences, to arrange them, to word the demonstrations, but 
above all is verification necessary” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.27) 
“It usually happens that it [the illumination] does not deceive him [the 
mathematician], but it also sometimes happens, as I have said, that it [the 
illumination] does not stand the test of verification” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.29) 
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“…we might hope to find the product ready-made upon our awakening, or again 
that an algebraic calculation, for example a verification, would be made 
unconsciously.  Nothing of the sort, as observation proves.” (Poincaré, 
1908/1952, p.31) 
These “inspirations, fruits of unconscious work” provided “a point of departure” for 
further calculations (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.31).  The period of conscious work that follows 
the inspiration verifies the results and deduces their consequences.  Poincaré described three 
incidents involving the interplay of Illumination, ‘impasse’ (a term used by subsequent 
researchers but not in Poincaré’s own account), and Verification. 
First, he established the existence of a particular class of Fuchsian functions (the 
‘hyper-geometric series’) as follows: “for fifteen days I strove to prove…I seated myself at 
my work table , stayed an hour or two, tried a great number of combinations and reached no 
results”.  Then one evening “contrary to [his] custom” Poincaré drank some black coffee 
“and could not sleep.  Ideas arose in crowds; I felt them collide until pairs 
interlocked…making a stable combination”.  By the next day he had established the existence 
of the series and “had only to write out the results, which took but a few hours” (Poincaré, 
1908/1952, p.25). 
Second, he further described another moment of insight that occurred on a geological 
excursion which had made him “forget his mathematical work”.  The illuminative moment 
occurred this time as he stepped onto a bus: “At the moment when I put my foot on the step 
the idea came to me, without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way 
for it” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.26).  At this point Poincaré made his first specific reference to 
the need for Verification: “I did not verify the idea; I should not have had time…taking my 
seat upon the omnibus” and continuing a conversation, but on his return home to Caen he 
“verified the result at [his] leisure” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.26). 
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Third, a similar experience occurred after he went to spend a few days by the seaside, 
being vexed apparently at reaching an impasse to the extent that he was “disgusted” with his 
failure in the study of “some arithmetical questions” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.26).  This break 
gave him the opportunity to think “of something else” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.26).  Out 
walking one morning along a small cliff the insight came with a “brevity, suddenness and 
immediate certainty” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.26).  He then described the process of working 
out the consequences of his discovery as a “perfectly conscious” process in which he 
“form[ed] all these functions”, “made a systematic attack upon them”, and “carried all the 
outworks, one after another”.  However this only served to “show me the difficulty” leading 
to yet another impasse; one question “still held out” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.26).  The 
solution “suddenly appeared” to him as he was “going along the street” during his period of 
military service in Mont-Valerien (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.26).  And it was only after his 
service that arranged all the elements and put them together and was thereby able to write-out 
his “final memoir at a single stroke without difficulty” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.26).  He 
confined his descriptions of these processes to the example of Fuchsian functions only.  In so 
far as his other researches are concerned he maintained that he “would have to say analogous 
things” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.27) about them also. 
One of the aspects of Poincaré’s account of mathematical creation which does not 
manifest explicitly in The Art of Thought is the interplay between ‘conscious work’ and 
‘unconscious work’.  For Poincaré Illumination is a “manifest sign of long unconscious prior 
work”, moreover unconscious work is possible and “only fruitful” if it is preceded and 
followed by a period of conscious work.  Sudden inspirations “never happen” unless they 
have been preceded by “fruitless” voluntary efforts which may not have been as “sterile” as 
they appear because “they have set agoing the unconscious machine” which, without 
conscious efforts, “would not have moved and would have produced nothing” (Poincaré, 
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1908/1952, p.27).  The first period of conscious work is Preparation; the second period of 
conscious work involves arranging, putting “in shape” and wording the inspiration, deducing 
its consequences, and its Verification (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.27).  Poincaré underlined the 
significance of this second bout of conscious work by noting that inspirations often are 
accompanied by “absolute certitude”, and that this feeling is not usually “a deceiver” but this 
is not a rule that is without exception (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.27).  Certitude can deceive the 
discoverer “without being any the less vivid”, and this fact may only become apparent when 
the discoverer seeks to demonstrate the findings (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.27).  As a post-
script Poincaré noted in particular that ideas coming in the morning or evening “in bed while 
in a semi-hypnagogic state” can deceive, and they in particular must be put to the test of 
Verification (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.27). 
Wallas’ four-stage model 
Based largely but not exclusively on the accounts of Helmholtz and Poincaré, Wallas 
proposed four stages.  The model presents a synthesis of the three stages of scientific 
discovery discernable from Helmholtz’s 70th birthday speech, the role of unconscious and 
conscious mental processes in mathematical creation, and the need for Verification as 
revealed in Poincaré’s introspections. 
Preparation and Verification: these stages ‘book-end’ the process.  The mode of thought in 
Preparation is conscious, “voluntary” (Wallas, 1926, p.85) and “regulated” rather than a 
“wild ranging of the mind” (p.83).  Wallas included logic, mathematics, experimental and 
observational sciences in Preparation.  One of the ways Preparation might be achieved was 
through education which gives the ‘educated man’ “a body of remembered facts and words 
which gives him a wider range in the final moment of association, as well as a number of 
those habitual tracks of association which constitute ‘thought systems’” (ibid.).  Following 
the same line of reasoning as Poincaré, Wallas argued that Verification resembles Preparation 
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in so far as it is under conscious control and relies on the same mathematical and logical 
rules.  Having circumscribed the model with the first and final stages Wallas then turned his 
attention to describing the second and third stages (Incubation and Illumination). 
Incubation: for Wallas Incubation had both positive and negative attributes.  Its ‘negative’ 
attribute was that during Incubation “we do not voluntarily or consciously think on a 
particular problem” (Wallas, 1926, p.86).  Its ‘positive’ attribute was that “a series of 
unconscious and involuntary (or foreconscious and forevoluntary) mental events may take 
place” (ibid.).  As for the first attribute Wallas argued that the abstention from mental work 
may take one of two forms, and described these as two forms of incubation as follows: 
“conscious mental work on other problems” (referred to in this article as ‘distraction’); 
“relaxation from all mental work” (referred to in this article as ‘mental relaxation’) (Wallas, 
1926, p.86).  Incubation is a fertile resource for the creative thinker, therefore posing the 
problem in conscious thought (Preparation) as early as possible maximizes the amount time 
for ‘extending’ and ‘enriching’ the mental operations of subconscious thought.  Wallas 
argued that the first form of incubation (distraction) was more effective for less difficult 
forms of creative thought (such as a preacher composing “his Sunday sermon”, Wallas, 1926, 
p.86). 
In the case of the more difficult forms of creative thought (such as “a scientific 
discovery”, “writing of a poem”, or a “political decision”) it is more desirable that there be a 
period of total mental relaxation so that “nothing should interfere with the free working of the 
unconscious or partially conscious processes of the mind”( Wallas, 1926, p.87).  Wallas cited 
the example of the theory of evolution through natural selection: the two pioneers of this 
revolutionary idea were forced into mental relaxation, Alfred Russell Wallace by malaria, and 
Darwin through unspecified ‘ill-health’.  Wallas reasoned that these misfortunes “compelled” 
(ibid.) both Wallace and Darwin to desist from mental activity and thereby engage 
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involuntarily in Incubation.  Wallas argued further that the mental relaxation required in 
Incubation may benefit from, or even require, physical exercise (as in both Helmholtz’s and 
Poincaré’s experiences) and that that “the human organism gains more from the alternation of 
various forms of activity than from a constant devotion to one of them” (Wallas, 1926, p.90).  
For Wallas these activities amounted to methods for what might be termed ‘executive 
functions’ for the management of Incubation, however the control of Illumination was 
acknowledged to be a much more difficult challenge. 
Illumination: the Illumination stage is circumscribed by Wallas so as to “restrict it to [the] 
instantaneous [and unexpected] ‘flash’” representing the culmination of a “train of 
association” (Wallas, 1926, pp.93-94, emphasis added) ending with the “final ‘flash’ or 
‘click’” (ibid.).  In most subsequent accounts that are based on Wallas’ four-stage model 
Incubation is depicted as leading directly to Illumination.  However, Wallas devoted no less 
than 12 pages (Wallas, 1926, pp.95-107) of his ‘Stages of Control’ chapter to the 
phenomenon of the ‘fringe consciousness’ – the Intimation - that links Incubation and 
Illumination.  A close reading of The Art of Thought reveals Wallas’ model to have five rather 
than four stages (Fryer, 2012; Lubart, 2001; Sadler-Smith, 2008), see Figure 2. 
[FIGURE 2] 
Wallas’ model: More than meets the eye? 
Close reading of Wallas’ own account reveals a number of subtle and important distinctions 
not only between ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ states (following Poincaré’s different types 
of ‘mental work’), but also between ‘focal (“full luminosity”) consciousness’ and ‘fringe 
(periphery) consciousness’, see Figure 2.  Wallas used the metaphor of the Sun to represent 
consciousness (the domain of Preparation, Illumination and Verification) and the Sun’s 
corona to represent fringe consciousness (Intimation).  He also made a number of prescient 
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observations and intriguing speculations regarding the Intimations that inhabit the ‘fringe’ of 
consciousness.  Fringe consciousness phenomena may last up to the flash of illumination or 
continue beyond it, however this is difficult for a subject to report on phenomenologically it 
since it is likely to be - pursuing Wallas’ metaphor - ‘outshone’ by the full luminosity of 
Illumination.  He offered the negative examples of Poincaré and Helmholtz who, he argued, 
had either forgotten or not noticed any fringe consciousness phenomena but failing to 
acknowledge that they may not have experienced any Intimations as such.  But in support of 
the role of fringe consciousness he cited various authors and referred specifically to William 
James’ introspections: “the dying echo of whence it [the idea] came to us”, and “the halo or 
penumbra that surrounds and escorts [the image]” (William James, Principles, Vol. I, p.255 
cited in Wallas, 1926, p.97). 
Wallas’ psychology is eclectic and draws in large part (especially in Chapter 3 of The 
Art of Thought) on associationism.  He traced the concept of ‘association’ to Aristotle’s 
psychology (Wallas was an Oxford Classics scholar), and used the concept of an ‘association 
train’ or ‘train of associations’ to describe the dynamical processes operating between 
consciousness and non-consciousness.  Fringe consciousness manifests an awareness of an 
‘association-train’ in a state of rising consciousness “which indicates that the fully conscious 
flash of success is coming” (Wallas, 1926, p.97).  In support of this Wallas offered the 
account of a “high English civil servant” who related to him his personal experience that “I 
often know that the solution is coming, though I don’t know what the solution will be” 
(ibid.).  Wallas also cited the Belgian ‘pedagogic psychologist’ J. Varendonck’s Psychology 
of Daydreams (the introduction to which was written by Sigmund Freud), Dewey and Wundt 
to provide supporting evidence for the role of Intimations in scientific discovery: 
“When I became aware that my mind was simmering over something, I had a dim 
feeling which it is very difficult to describe; it was like a vague impression of 
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mental activity.  But when the association had risen to the surface, it expanded 
into an impression of joy” (Varendonck, 1921, p.282 cited in Wallas, 1926, p.97). 
“a vague feeling of the unexpected, or something queer, strange, funny, or 
disconcerting” (Dewey, 1910, How We Think, p.74, Cited in Wallas, 1926, p.98) 
“In diesem Sinn ist das Gefühl der Pionier der Erkenntniss” (In this sense, the 
feeling of the pioneer of knowledge) Wundt, 1893, cited in Wallas, 1926, p.98) 
Wallas also associated the degree (or “grade”) of consciousness involved in the creative 
process with visual and verbal imagery (see Wallas, 1926, p.61).  He described less-
conscious and fore-conscious states as being associated with increased occurrence of visual 
images, whilst in conscious mental work verbal processes are to the fore (Wallas, 1926, 
pp.70-73).  His interpretations resonate with the experiences Einstein related in his letter to 
Jacques Hadamard: “The physical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are 
certain signs and more or less clear images…Conventional words or other signs have to be 
sought laboriously only in a secondary stage” (Ghiselin, 1952/1985, pp.32-33). 
Illumination (equivalent to ‘insight’, see Sternberg & Davidson, 1995), by definition, is 
a singular moment (Wallas’ ‘flash’ or ‘click’), whereas Intimation is a manifestation of a 
‘rising train of association’ which may ‘ascend’ towards the threshold of consciousness at 
different rates and therefore last for varying lengths of time.  In so far as Wallas’ objective for 
an improved ‘art of thought’ was concerned he maintained that there could be few people 
“who will not gain by directing their attention from time to time to the feeling of Intimation, 
and by bringing their will to bear upon the cerebral processes which it indicates”, in 
Varendonck’s words “foreconscious processes for conscious ends” (Wallas, 1926, p.101). 
One of the ‘singular achievements’ that Wallas was interested in was ‘poetical 
expression’.  He offered Shakespeare’s description of the poet’s work as spoken by Theseus 
in Act V, Scene 1 of A Midsummer Night’s Dream as an illustration the relationship between 
Intimations and Illuminations (p.102): 
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“And as imagination bodies forth 
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen 
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name.” (William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream) 
Wallas, fascinated as he was with the control of Intimations and other forms of thought, 
was keen also to offer advice to the thinker.  He looked to the final verse of Robert Graves’ 
poem ‘A Pinch of Salt’ for guidance on how to balance the competing demands of Intimation 
and Illumination (p.103): 
“Poet, never chase the dream. 
Laugh yourself and turn away. 
Mask your hunger, let it seem 
Small matter if he come or stay; 
But when he nestles in your hand at last,  
Close up your fingers tight and hold him fast” (Robert Graves, A Pinch of Salt, 
1916-17) 
The delicate and ephemeral nature of Intimations present the creative thinker with three 
challenges (Wallas, 1926): first, letting the train of conscious arise as naturally as possible 
and not interfering too much in the process before the idea is as well-formed as possible 
(similar to the hypnagogic state [between wakefulness and sleep] in which the German 
chemist Kekulé claimed to have experienced in his discovery of the ring structure of benzene, 
see Boden, 2004; also in ‘lucid dreaming’, see Sparrow & Thurston, 2010); second, capturing 
the essence of Intimation so as to guard against it drifting away or being supplanted (as in 
Coleridge’s unwanted ‘visitor from Porlock’ who interrupted the poet’s creative Intimations 
during the writing of the unfinished Kubla Khan); third, trying to put into words thoughts 
which “are so elusive that to attempt to articulate them is to scare them away, as a fish is 
scared by the slightest ripple” (Wallas, 1926, p.105).  Wallas nonetheless acknowledged that 
sooner or later it is necessary “to make the conscious effort of expression” and thereby make 
“permanent his [or her] thought for the use of others” (Wallas, 1926, p.106).  Indeed 
Helmholtz, a seminal influence in the development of Wallas’ model, remarked that “I have 
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always so turned my problem about in all directions that I could see in my mind its turns and 
complications, and run through them freely without writing them down (Helmholtz, An 
autobiographical sketch, in Cahan, 1995, p.389). 
Theoretical and Evidential Implications 
A close reading of Wallas’ Chapter 4 (‘Stages of Control’) offers compelling grounds for the 
clear delineation and acknowledgement of Intimation as a linking stage between Incubation 
and Illumination in the creative process.  In doing so a ‘Five-Stage Model of the Creative 
Process’ is to be preferred over the traditional four-stage interpretation .  The model as 
depicted in Figure 3 is based on a close, first-hand reading and interpretation of Wallas’ 
account.  The model has three levels and five stages.  The three levels are organized in terms 
of proximity to consciousness (or “grades of consciousness”, Wallas, 1926, p.61).  
Preparation and Verification are achieved voluntarily and effortfully through conscious work, 
whereas Incubation is achieved involuntarily and effortlessly through non-conscious work 
and is not open to introspection.  Intimation occurs in the fringe of consciousness zone and is 
amenable only partly to attention and influence. 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Previous developments of Wallas’ four-stage model have developed novel 
interpretations for specific purposes, augmenting and adapting the model, and transcending 
Wallas’ original conceptualization (e.g. Cropley & Cropley, 2012).  By going to the original 
source (The Art of Thought) this article re-presents Wallas’ original model giving due 
emphasis to the Intimation stage.  The five-stage process as presented here is consistent both 
with Wallas’ own model of creativity and with the writings of the seminal figures on whose 
work he drew for inspiration (chiefly Helmholtz and Poincaré).  Although Wallas’ model is 
not a theory of creativity, it affords creativity researchers a unifying framework and general 
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conceptual architecture within which relevant concepts and theories from creativity research 
may be positioned, some of which are specified in Table 1. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Preparation is dependent on domain-specific knowledge.  Domain expertise (see 
Ericsson et al., 2007) forms the cognitive substrate for creativity; for example Cropley (2006) 
argued that if the French physicist Becquerel had not already been immersed deeply in 
relevant research he could not, by the chance coming together of uranium salts and 
photographic paper in a drawer, have discovered radioactivity, cf. Pasteur’s aphorism ‘chance 
favors the prepared mind’.  Creative individuals often endeavor to solve open-ended 
problems by drawing on information from the problem’s home domain but may also procure 
important knowledge from other seemingly unrelated source domains either through 
deliberate scanning or serendipity, for example, Charles Darwin’s (a biologist) reading of 
T.R. Malthus’ (a political economist) An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) which 
contributed to the creative insight leading to the theory of evolution through natural selection 
(Gruber, 1995).  Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues delineated ‘domain’ (i.e. cultural/symbolic 
system of rules and behaviors which determine what is permissible within its boundaries) 
from ‘field’ (see ‘Verification’ below).  Domain and field are inter-related aspects of the 
socio-cultural environment in which creativity is located (Csikszentmihalyi, 2006; 
Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995).  The symbolic resources of the domain determine what is 
intellectually and creatively possible.  The mastery of the domain enables Preparation. 
Incubation serves a guiding function to the extent that clues that reflect and ultimately 
reveal coherence automatically activate relevant networks in a gradual and cumulative 
fashion by a neural process of ‘spreading activation’ (Bowers et al., 1990) involving the 
collective co-spiking of neurons “referred to as neural cliques” (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013, 
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p.28, original emphases).  Simonton (1999), in a review of experimental, psychometric and 
historiometric evidence, argued that the creative process itself is ‘Darwinian’ in that blind 
variation and selective retention play vital roles in a generic creative process.  Both spreading 
activation and blind variation/selective retention are captured in Wallas’ Incubation stage.  
More recently Dijksterhuis and colleagues have proposed an Unconscious Thought Theory 
(UTT) which also resonates with Wallas’ incubation stage in that it proposes that “contrary to 
conventional wisdom, it is not always advantageous to engage in thorough deliberation 
before choosing” and that ‘unconscious thought’ has a “generative power” with respect to 
creative cognition and complex decision making (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006, p.1005). 
Wallas’ Intimations bear a strong resemblance to creative intuitions defined variously 
as: (1) “a vague anticipatory perception that orients creative work in a promising direction”, 
Policastro (1995, p. 99); (2) “Feelings that arise when knowledge is combined in novel ways” 
(Dane & Pratt, 2009, p.5); (3) “slow-to-form affectively-charged judgments occurring in 
advance of an insight that combine knowledge in novel ways based on divergent associations, 
and which orient behavior in a direction that may lead to a creative outcome” (Gore & 
Sadler-Smith, 2012, p.308).  Intimations also share similarities with the phenomenon of 
‘feelings of knowing’ (see: Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001) and the neural mechanisms for 
“creative intuitions” discussed by Thagard (2014, p.287). 
Both Intimation and Illumination are elusive phenomena.  Nonetheless, 
neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies are beginning to offer preliminary biological 
evidence for a number of neural correlates of these processes.  The key findings from 
Dietrich and Kanso’s (2010) critical review of this field may be summarized thus: (1) 
contrary to conventional wisdom Illuminations are not generally associated with right 
hemispheric dominance; (2) Illumination is associated with decreased alpha power; (3) the 
superior temporal gyrus (STG) plays some role in solving insight problems that require 
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verbal trains of associations; (4) activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is 
associated with insight problem solving; (5) the role that the prefrontal cortex plays in 
Illumination is as yet unclear with the possibility that “both prefrontal activation and 
deactivation are at work” each being “associated with its own types of insight experience” 
(p.844).  For a further review of cognitive neuroscience and creativity see Sawyer (2011) 
Finally, Verification takes place within the socio-cultural environment instantiated in 
Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of ‘field’.  The field is made up of expert individuals who 
practice in the domain and represent the social organization of the domain and embody its 
rules.  These are enacted by the members of the field (e.g. critics, curators, grant awarding 
bodies, peer reviewers, journal editors, prize committees, investors, venture capitalists, etc.) 
who act as ‘gatekeepers’.  Creative insights do not exist in a vacuum because their 
Verification is culturally and historically bound to traditions and social structures (Amabile, 
1996, p. 37). 
A further, less well-trodden path in creativity research which Wallas draws our 
attention to from his reading of Poincaré’s account of mathematical discovery is the role of 
sensibilité in the creative process.  Sensibilité is an ambiguous term which may be translated 
as ‘feelings’ or ‘sensibility’ its function is to act as a “selective force” playing the role of a 
“delicate sieve” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.29) which enables the selection of the “apparently 
right solution” whilst rejecting the “apparently wrong solution” (Wallas, 1926, p.75).  
Poincaré’s own account concerned how the “interesting” combinations formed as a result of 
the “automatism of the subliminal [unconscious] self” “break into the domain of 
consciousness” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.28).  Poincaré does not attribute this breaking-though 
to chance, rather it is as a result of the strength of the accompanying affect which leads to 
“only the most intense [experiences]” influencing “our emotional sensibility”, furthermore 
this process is linked to the aesthetic feeling for the beauty of the harmony and form of 
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numbers that all “real” mathematicians know (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.29).  Wallas described 
this emotional sensibility for mathematical beauty as “aesthetic instinct” (Wallas, 1926, 
p.76).  Poincaré described it as those creations whose elements are “harmoniously disposed 
so that the mind without effort can embrace their totality while realizing the details…The 
useful combinations are precisely the most beautiful” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.29). 
A further aspect of sensibilité in Poincare’s account is the intuiting of a ‘mathematical 
order’ that enables the mathematician to “divine hidden harmonies and relations” by means 
of “a glance [at] the reasoning as a whole” (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.24).  Moreover, these 
harmonious relations protect the mathematician from forgetting vital elements in the manifest 
order of things because eventually as this order unfolds “each of them [elements] will take its 
allotted place in the array”.  Poincaré went on to argue that without this “delicate feeling” an 
understanding of higher mathematics will be unattainable, and this “special intuition” 
(possessed by individuals to greater or lesser extents) confers mathematical creativity on 
those who have it (Poincaré, 1908/1952, p.24).  Several intuition researchers have drawn 
attention to the role played by affect in creative intuitions (e.g. Dane & Pratt, 2009) and the 
productive relationship between ‘intuitive awareness’ and creativity (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 
2007) 
Poincaré’s emphasis on ‘sensibility’ resonates with that of the English theoretical 
physicist and Nobel Laureate Paul Dirac (1902-1984).  For Dirac it was “more important to 
have beauty in one’s equations than to have them fit experiment…It seems that if one is 
working from the point of view of getting beauty in one’s equations, and if one has really 
sound insight, one is on a sure line of progress” (Dirac, 1963, p.47) (in the same Scientific 
American article Dirac also speculated that “God is a mathematician of a very high order”).  
Dirac’s contentions are not uncontentious; for example Simonton expressed the view that “no 
scientist would ever be so bold as to justify a theory on so irrational a basis ‘beauty’” (1988, 
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p.193).  Nevertheless, these various arguments point towards a promising line of inquiry that 
might lead eventually to the delineation of an ‘aesthetic intuition’ (see Wild, 1938 for an 
early exposition of this concept) as an a-rational (as opposed to irrational, cf. Simonton 
above) component in creative problem solving.  Aesthetic intuition may have relevance to 
scientific and artistic creativity alongside other types of intuition such as the problem-solving, 
expert, and creative intuitions identified by Dane and Pratt (2009) and Osbeck and Held 
(2014). 
Wallas’ Art of Thought is essentially a pragmatic book concerned with the 
improvement of thinking.  Several suggestions for enabling and enhancing creative thinking 
stem from Wallas’ five stages.  Distraction, mental relaxation, and physical exercise help to 
control Incubation and facilitate Illumination.  Becoming more aware phenomenologically of 
sensibilities and creative intuitions as they arise focuses attention on Intimations.  Dunn et al. 
(2010, p.1842) raise the intriguing possibility that there may be individual differences in the 
ability perceive the “subtle bodily changes” which mark intuitions interoceptively.  The art of 
creative thought requires a fine balance between Preparation through deep immersion in the 
domain, creating the conditions for Incubation to proceed, allowing Intimations to arise as 
naturally and freely as possible, capturing their essence without interfering with their 
progress towards the final Illuminative moment, and the objective and aesthetic Verification 
of the creative value of final outcome. 
Directions for further research are suggested.  For example, Wallas himself 
recommended that it would be interesting to examine the “biographies of a couple of hundred 
original thinkers and writers” in order to examine the Incubation stage in more depth (1926, 
p.87).  Aside of a small number of exceptions (e.g. Klein, 2013; Klein & Jarosz, 2011; 
Thagard, 2014) investigations on the scale suggested by Wallas have yet to be conducted 
systematically.  Such research could also be extended to test if and how intimations precede 
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illumination (see Figure 1).  A variety of research approaches are most likely to be required 
including phenomenological studies, historiometric analyses, studies of biographies, 
individual difference studies, and cognitive neuroscience studies.  One of the main challenges 
that researchers face is the unpredictability of occurrence of intimations and illuminations; 
capturing these events as close as possible to their occurrence is the ideal, for example by 
using concurrent protocol analysis (Baldacchino, Ucbasaran, Lockett, & Cabantous, 2014), 
diary methods, or mobile technology applications to enable subjects to record their 
interoceptions and introspections concurrently (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2011).  It is 
hoped that as a result of specifying Wallas’ model with greater detail and more fidelity than 
has previously been the case this article will enable creativity researchers to better understand 
the subtleties and nuances the interplay of consciousness, fringe consciousness, and non-
consciousness in the creative process, the dynamics of which constitute a modern 
interpretation of the ‘art of thought’. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Graham Wallas deep in thought, circa 1920s (Reproduced by kind permission of 
London School of Economics Library’s Collections, Imagelibrary/272) 
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Figure 2. Five stages of the creative process 
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Figure 3. The creative process in terms of “grades of consciousness” (Wallas, 1926, p.61) (proximity to consciousness) 
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Table 1.  Five-stage model mapped against related concepts and relevant sources 
Stage Related Concepts Relevant Sources 
Preparation Domain Csikszentmihalyi (2006) 
 Complex domain relevant schemas Dane & Pratt (2007) 
 Expertise Ericsson et al. (2007); Klein, 2013 
Incubation Spreading activation Bowers et al. (1990) 
 Unconscious thought theory Dijksterhuis & Meurs (2006) 
 Blind variation/selective retention Simonton (1999) 
 Neural cliques and neurds Gabora (2010); Gabora & Ranjan 
(2013) 
Intimation Creative intuition Dane & Pratt (2009); Gore & Sadler-
Smith (2011); Policastro (1995); 
Thagard (2014) 
 Feelings of knowing Koriat & Levy-Sadot (2001) 
Illumination Anterior superior temporal gyrus 
activation 
Jung-Beeman, et al. (2004) 
 Neural cliques and neurds Gabora (2010); Gabora & Ranjoan 
(2013) 
 Neural representation, recursive 
binding, semantic pointer 
competition 
Thagard (2014) 
Verification System Amabile (1996) 
 Field Csikszentmihalyi (2006) 
 Aesthetic intuition Dirac (1963); Wild (1938) 
 
